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The Hours are Long: Unreasonable
Delay After Jordan
Palma Paciocco*

All I know is that the hours are long, under these conditions, and
constrain us to beguile them with proceedings which – how shall I say
– which may at first sight seem reasonable, until they become a habit.

–

Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot (1954)

I. INTRODUCTION
In its most recent case on the section 11(b) Charter right to be tried
within a reasonable time,1 R. v. Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada
invoked “the familiar maxim: ‘Justice delayed is justice denied.’”2
Marshall McLuhan once ventured a characteristically maverick rejoinder
to that particular old chestnut: “Whereas convictions depend on speedups, justice requires delay.”3 In reality, both aphorisms hit upon
important truths about our criminal justice system. Taken together, they
underscore the importance of carefully calibrating the right to be tried
within a reasonable time.
As criminal cases drag on, penological goals are undermined;
presumptively innocent accused persons are left languishing in pre-trial
*
Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. I am grateful to
Professors Benjamin Berger and Sonia Lawrence for organizing the 20th Annual Constitutional Cases
Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School and for editing the present volume, and to all those who assisted
them in these endeavours; to the many participants at the Constitutional Cases Conference, especially
Professor Steve Coughlan, for their valuable feedback, insightful questions, and engaging conversation;
to Professor François Tanguay-Renaud and the students in his Winter 2017 Criminal Procedure course
for their stimulating comments and questions during a guest lecture I gave on R. v. Jordan; and to an
anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1
Section 11(b) of the Charter states: “Any person charged with an offence has the right …
to be tried within a reasonable time”: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter
“Charter”].
2
[2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27, at para. 19 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jordan”].
3
Marshallmcluhan.com, online: <https://marshallmcluhan.com/mcluhanisms/>.
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detention or under restrictive bail conditions; victims and witnesses are
further traumatized; evidence deteriorates; and the public loses faith in
the criminal justice system.4 At the same time, excessive speed poses
its own threat to the integrity of the criminal justice system: a rapid,
“conveyor belt” approach to meting out justice hardly inspires public
confidence, as illustrated by widespread antipathy towards rote pleabargaining.5 Moreover, many of the rights of accused persons take
considerable time to vindicate.6 In this light, finding the ideal balance
between speed-up and delay is a challenging task. The task is all the more
daunting when we factor in the decidedly non-ideal conditions that
characterize our criminal justice system, most notably chronic resource
limitations. Crowns, judges, and court staff are overtaxed.7 Habitual
underfunding of legal aid programs results in a large number of selfrepresented litigants whose cases often take longer to process.8 Outmoded
technologies and insufficient technical support in courtrooms further
exacerbate the problem.9 If haste makes waste, dearth makes delay.
Jordan represents the Court’s most recent attempt to strike an ideal
balance in decidedly non-ideal circumstances. The case was close and
controversial. A bare majority overturned the existing law and introduced
a new section 11(b) framework. That framework is both promising and
problematic. It is the focus of the present article. Part II of this article
4
See, generally “Delaying Justice is Denying Justice”: Report of the Standing Senate
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (August 2016), online: <https://sencanada.ca/content/
sen/committee/421/LCJC/reports/CourtDelaysStudyInterimReport_e.pdf> [hereinafter “Delaying Justice
is Denying Justice”].
5
S. Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012),
at xvi.
6
Justice Cromwell makes precisely this point in his concurring reasons in Jordan, supra,
note 2, at para. 150.
7
“Delaying Justice is Denying Justice”, supra, note 4, at 8. To some extent, Crowns’
excessive workloads are self-inflicted. Crown attorneys sometimes make the discretionary decision
to move forward with prosecutions in minor cases where criminal sanctions are arguably not
warranted, or where diversionary processes would be more productive. Some Crowns may, for
example, abnegate their duty to make careful charging decisions because they over-rely on the
recommendations of police officers when deciding which cases to pursue. The Honourable
M. Rosenberg, “The Attorney General and the Administration of Criminal Justice” (2009), 34 Queen’s
L.J. 813-862, at 829-30. For an argument that Crowns should be far more circumspect in pursuing
prosecutions, see, e.g., M.-E. Sylvestre, “Rethinking Criminal Responsibility for Poor Offenders: Choice,
Monstrosity, and the Logic of Practice” (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 771-817, at 811 and 814.
8
Department of Justice Canada, “Legal Research Series: Court Site Study of Adult
Unrepresented Accused in the Provincial Criminal Courts, Part 1: Overview Report” (2002) at 33,
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/rr03_la2-rr03_aj2/rr03_la2.pdf>.
9
In R. v. J.M., [2017] O.J. No. 256, 2017 ONCJ 4 (Ont. C.J.), for example, unreasonable
delay was partly caused by technical failures in the courtroom [hereinafter “J.M.”]. See also
“Delaying Justice is Denying Justice”, supra, note 4, at 13-14.
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offers a brief overview of the case law preceding Jordan. Part III
explains the Jordan framework. Part IV critically assesses the central
feature of that framework: a presumptive ceiling on reasonable delay.
Part V addresses a second key feature: the removal of prejudice as an
explicit factor in the section 11(b) analysis. Part VI concludes.

II. THE ROAD TO JORDAN
To understand why the Jordan majority felt the need to reinvent
section 11(b), it is helpful to survey some of the case law that came
before. Between 1986 and 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada issued
several section 11(b) decisions in which it established a flexible
balancing test for section 11(b) claims10 but struggled to converge on a
decisive list of factors to be weighed.11 In 1989, in R. v. Smith, the Court
issued its first unanimous section 11(b) decision and affirmed four
factors: the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; defence waiver;
and prejudice to the accused.12 The Court acknowledged ongoing
disagreement among its members as to how those factors should be
interpreted and balanced, with particular disagreement about prejudice.
The following year, it addressed section 11(b) yet again in a decision
that was to become notorious in Canadian jurisprudence: R. v. Askov.13
Prior to Askov, the Court’s section 11(b) cases had all involved delays
that were unusually long relative to the average timelines in their own
jurisdictions. In Askov, by contrast, the complaint was that the delay was
unjustified despite being in line with local practice.14 To adjudicate this
claim, the majority compared the delays in Peel District, where Askov
originated, to those in other jurisdictions. It did so on the basis of the
evidence presented by the parties together with data collected on its own
initiative after oral argument.15 This comparison led the majority to
10
R. v. Mills, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]; R. v.
Rahey, [1987] S.C.J. No. 23, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Conway, [1989] S.C.J. No. 70,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conway”].
11
J.F.R. Levesque, “Trial Within a Reasonable Time” (1988) 31 Crim. L.Q. 55, 55; and see
Conway, id., at 1673.
12
R. v. Smith, [1989] S.C.J. No. 119, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.).
13
R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Askov”].
14
S.G. Coughlan, “R. v. Askov – A Bold Step Not Boldly Taken” (1991) 33 Crim. L.Q. 247
[hereinafter “Coughlan, ‘A Bold Step’”].
15
C. Baar, “Court Delay as Social Science Evidence: The Supreme Court of Canada and
‘Trial Within a Reasonable Time’” (1997) 19:2 Justice System Journal 123, at 133 [hereinafter
“Baar, ‘Court Delay’”].
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conclude that the average delays in Peel were indeed unreasonable.16 The
Court, wrote: “Making a very rough comparison and more than doubling
the longest waiting period to make every allowance for the special
circumstances in Peel would indicate that a period of delay in a range of
some six to eight months between committal and trial might be deemed to
be the outside limit of what is reasonable.”17
By now the fallout from Askov is legend. Numerous courts took very
literally the admonishment that a six to eight-month delay may be
unreasonable and immediately began to stay cases that surpassed that limit.
In Ontario, where delay was especially bad, some 51,791 criminal charges
were stayed, withdrawn, or dismissed in the 13 months following Askov.18 In
a fascinating article, Professor Carl Baar, whose empirical work was relied
on in Askov, explained that the Court did not foresee this result because it
misinterpreted his data and because its supplementary research was flawed.19
The Court acted quickly to staunch the flow of cases hemorrhaging
out of the system, scheduling oral arguments in two pending section
11(b) appeals.20 The lead judgment, Morin, emphasized that the guideline
for institutional delay articulated in Askov was to be applied flexibly
and contextually and adjusted to account for “local conditions” and
“changing circumstances”.21 The Court established a parallel, eight to
10-month guideline for provincial courts based on its findings that those
courts have a heavier workload and take more time on average to dispose
of cases.22 These findings were drawn from a voluminous record, but as
reported by Baar, the Court once again misinterpreted the data.23
16

Askov, supra, note 13, at 1240.
Id.
18
Baar, “Court Delay”, supra, note 15, at 130. Some post-Askov analyses report that over
47,000 charges were stayed or withdrawn in Ontario following the release of the judgment. That
number is for the period from October 22, 1990 to September 6, 1991 and was reported in R. v.
Morin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, at 779 (S.C.C.), per Lamer C.J.C., dissenting but
not on this point [hereinafter “Morin”].
19
Baar, id., at 133. Baar notes, inter alia, that the Court seems to have mistakenly relied on
data from 1984 that was no longer current, and which had in fact been presented to the Court by way
of contrasting the average timeline for cases in 1984 with the more protracted timeline that had come
to exist by the time Askov was decided a few years later.
20
Carl Baar, “Social Facts, Court Delay and the Charter” in F.L. Morton, ed., Law,
Politics, and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3d ed. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002),
at 375, 381.
21
Morin, supra, note 18, at 799-800.
22
Id., at 799.
23
Baar, “Court Delay”, supra, note 15, at 135. Baar notes, for example, that the Court based
its guidelines for summary offence on information about indictable offences committed to trial
following preliminary hearings, and that it conflated data on cases filed with data on cases
pending, among other errors.
17
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In practice, any empirical errors in Morin mattered far less than those in
Askov, however, because Morin’s key implication was clear: “Morin sent
a message – in what can only barely be described as subtext rather than
text – that the right to a trial within a reasonable time did not matter.”24
This message was conveyed with particular force through the Court’s
comments on the prejudice factor. The Court affirmed that “prejudice to
the accused can be inferred from prolonged delay”, but in the very same
paragraph opined that “many, perhaps most, accused are not anxious to
have an early trial”.25 The effect, according to Steve Coughlan, “was a
decade and a half in which successful section 11(b) claims were rare.”26
In 2009, in R. v. Godin, a unanimous Court “made an attempt to
reverse that result” by underscoring that section 11(b) claims should not
hinge on evidence of specific prejudice.27 The Court also tried to
discourage “micro-counting” — the process of assiduously parsing out
every discrete source of delay that had come to characterize section 11(b)
analyses — insisting on the importance of not “los[ing] sight of the forest
for the trees”.28 Despite these clarifications, lower courts continued to
engage in the painstaking process of taxonimizing and tallying every
single source of delay; a process that the Jordan majority described as
“the bane of every trial judge’s existence.”29 Some courts also continued,
rather absurdly, to seek evidence of inferred prejudice, and to dismiss
cases for lack of prejudice.30 These two trends were front-of-mind when
the Court heard Jordan.

III. R. V. JORDAN
Barrett Richard Jordan, together with nine co-accused, was charged with
a number of drug-related offences. His case took just under 50 months
to wend its way through the system. During that time, he spent two
months in custody and nearly four years under restrictive bail conditions.
For 15 months during the latter period, he was under a conditional
24
S. Coughlan, “R. v. Jordan: A Dramatically New Approach to Trial Within a Reasonable
Time” (2016) 29 C.R. (7th) 311 [hereinafter “Coughlan, ‘A Dramatically New Approach’”].
25
Morin, supra, note 18, at 801.
26
Coughlan, “A Dramatically New Approach”, supra, note 24.
27
Id.; R. v. Godin, [2009] S.C.J. No. 26, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 30-31 and 38 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Godin”].
28
Godin, id., at para. 18. See Coughlan, “A Dramatically New Approach”, supra, note 24.
29
Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 37.
30
Id., at para. 200 (per Cromwell J., concurring); Coughlan, “A Dramatically New
Approach”, supra, note 24.
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sentencing order following a conviction for unrelated drug charges.
Jordan brought a section 11(b) application for a stay of proceedings,
which was dismissed. He was convicted of five drug-related charges.
In analyzing Jordan’s section 11(b) claim, the trial judge found that
his case took 49.5 months to complete, of which 32.5 months were
attributable to institutional delay. The judge held that, while this period
was well beyond the Morin guidelines, institutional delay should be
given less weight than Crown delay in the balancing analysis. He held,
further, that because much of the delay coincided with Jordan’s 15-month
conditional sentence, the prejudicial effect on Jordan’s liberty and
security interests was reduced. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia
denied Jordan’s appeal. Jordan appealed to the Supreme Court, where he
objected to how the trial judge had weighed institutional delay and to the
trial judge’s treatment of prejudice.31 In response, a slim majority of the
Supreme Court undertook a complete overhaul of the section 11(b) case
law, establishing a new standard that relies less on distinctions among
types of delay, and which dispenses with the prejudice factor altogether.
It recently affirmed this new standard in R. v. Cody.32
The central feature of the new framework is a ceiling on how much
time can presumptively elapse between charging and the end of trial:
18 months for provincial court cases; and 30 months for cases in superior
court or for those tried in provincial court following a preliminary
inquiry. If a trial is not concluded (or is not expected to be concluded)
within that period, then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. The
charges must therefore be stayed unless the Crown can establish that the
delay was justified. If a trial is concluded within that time period (or if it
is expected to be), then the delay is presumptively reasonable. The onus
then falls on the defence to prove otherwise.
As under the previous law, a court faced with a section 11(b) challenge
must begin by calculating the total period of delay from charging through to
the actual or anticipated end of trial. This period does not include “defence
delay”: delay that is unequivocally waived by the defence; or delay caused
solely by defence conduct that is not “legitimately taken to respond to the
charges”.33 Having identified the total period of delay and deducted any
defence delay, the court can readily determine whether the complained-of
delay falls above or below the ceiling.
31
32
33

Appellant’s Factum, Barrett Richard Jordan v. Her Majesty the Queen (File No. 36068), at 20.
[2017] S.C.J. No. 31, 2017 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cody”].
Jordan, supra, note 2, at paras. 61, 191 and 65.
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If the ceiling is breached, then the onus falls on the Crown to show the
delay was reasonable by virtue of “exceptional circumstances”. Exceptional
circumstances have two features: they are either reasonably unforeseen or
reasonably unavoidable; and once they arise, the Crown cannot reasonably
remedy the resultant delay. Exceptional circumstances need not be rare.34
They generally fall into one of two categories.35 The first, “discrete events”,
are isolated incidents like medical emergencies or a complainant’s
unexpected recantation. A period of delay that is attributed to a discrete
event must be subtracted from the total delay. If the remaining delay still
falls above the ceiling, then a stay must be entered; if it does not, then the
onus shifts to the accused to show the delay was nevertheless
unreasonable.36 The second category of exceptional circumstances is
“particularly complex cases”: cases in which the evidence or the issues
demand an unusual amount of preparation or trial time. If the delay is
justified by virtue of the case’s complexity, then ipso facto it is not
unreasonable and no stay issues.37 Exceptional circumstances are the only
basis upon which the Crown can justify a presumptively unreasonable
delay; it cannot rely on chronic institutional delay, the gravity of the
offence, or the absence of prejudice.38
If the ceiling is not breached, then it falls to the defence to
demonstrate unreasonableness. To do so, the defence must show that “it
took meaningful steps to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the
proceedings” and that “the case took markedly longer than it reasonably
should have.”39 When considering whether a case took markedly longer
than it reasonably should have, a court should “adopt a bird’s-eye view
of the case” rather than engaging in “micro-counting”.40 The majority
voiced an expectation that “stays beneath the ceiling [are] to be rare, and
limited to clear cases.”41
Finally, recognizing that institutional actors need time to remedy
chronic institutional delay, and insisting that the justice system cannot
afford a repeat of Askov, the majority introduced a transitional
framework for cases already in the system when Jordan was released.
Jordan applies to those cases, but with two caveats. First, where the
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id., at para. 69.
Id., at para. 71.
Id., at paras. 71-76.
Id., at paras. 77-80.
Id., at para. 81.
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at para. 91.
Id., at para. 48.
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ceiling is breached, the Crown may be able to justify the delay “based on
the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed.”42
Second, where the delay falls below the ceiling, considerations of
whether the defence took steps to move the case along, and of whether
the case took markedly longer than was reasonably required, are to be
applied contextually, again in recognition of the fact that the parties had
been operating without notice of the Jordan standard.43

IV. THE JORDAN CEILING
Writing on behalf of himself and three others, Cromwell J.
(concurring) listed several objections to the new framework,44 which he
described as “wrong in principle and unwise in practice.”45 He would
have refined the existing law instead of overhauling it.
Justice Cromwell’s first objection was that “the ceilings substitute a
right for ‘trial under the ceiling[s]’ ... for the constitutional right to be
tried within a reasonable time.”46 In response, the majority emphasized
that the ceiling does not obviate a reasonableness analysis; rather, it
allocates the burden of proof for purposes of that very analysis.47 Even
so, Cromwell J.’s objection has merit in light of the “anchoring effect”.
By virtue of this well-known heuristic — “a ubiquitous phenomenon in
human judgment”48 — people presented with a number that is meant to
serve as a reference point predictably fixate on the number and do not
adjust up or down enough to rationally account for context-specific
information.49 The ceiling is likely to have precisely this effect: judges
may come to equate “unreasonable delay” with delay surpassing 18 or
30 months, regardless of individual case factors. The effect may be
especially strong in cases of delay falling below the ceiling, since the
42

Id., at para. 96.
Id. at para. 99.
44
This article addresses three of these objections. The others are: that the ceilings may
result in thousands of cases being stayed; that they do not actually simplify the law; and that an
overhaul of the jurisprudence was unnecessary given that the Court unanimously agreed the appeal
could readily be decided on the basis of the prior law. Id., at para. 147.
45
Id., at para. 302.
46
Id., at para. 147 (citation omitted).
47
Id., at paras. 51 and 58.
48
A. Furnham & H. Chu Boo, “A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect” (2011) 40
The Journal of Socio-Economics 35, at 35.
49
S. Bibas, “Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial” 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463 at
2515-17 (2004).
43
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majority’s insistence that such cases will only rarely be stayed should
make judges especially wary of departing from the presumption.50
Arguably, the ceiling actually depends upon the anchoring effect. Its
purpose is to unsettle and recalibrate judges’ valuations of unreasonable
delay. For it to have this result, judges must take seriously the presumption
that delay above the ceiling is unreasonable even if it is common in their
localities. If they do not, then Jordan will turn out as Morin did.51
According to one Jordan intervener, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of
Ontario (“the Association”), complacency about delay “can be traced to the
Morin decision and the signal it sent that the right to a trial within a
‘reasonable time’ contemplates endless flexibility.”52 A loose balancing test
unmoored from a stable presumptive standard can lead judges to use their
localized expectations as anchors. Like the proverbial slow-boiling frog,
they can thereby come to normalize ever-increasing periods of delay.
Recognizing this phenomenon, the Association pushed for a
presumptive ceiling, stating: “Boundless flexibility is incompatible with
the concept of a Charter right”.53 As a general rule, this statement must
be correct: a right is more valuable to the extent that it has specific,
authoritative content; and a putative right with no stable content is
illusory. Yet, while the idea of a clear ex ante standard for section 11(b)
claims is appealing, it is hard to translate into practice. How can a court
fix on a universal ceiling that will reduce delay across diverse cases
without provoking a tidal wave of stays? This question brings us to
Cromwell J.’s second and third objections: “creating these types of
ceilings is a task better left to legislation”; and “the ceilings are not
supported by the record or by [the majority’s] analysis of the last 10 years
of s. 11(b) jurisprudence and have not been the subject of adversarial
debate.”54 I will take up each objection in turn.
The notion that establishing ceilings “is a task better left to legislation”
is animated by the fact that trial management is a quintessentially
polycentric issue.55 In Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
50

Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 83.
Morin, supra, note 18.
52
R. v. Jordan (File No. 36068), Factum of Intervener, Criminal Lawyers’ Association
(Ontario) at paras. 8-10.
53
Id., at para. 12. The Association did not propose a particular number but merely endorsed
the ceiling-based approach in principle.
54
Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 147.
55
L.L. Fuller, “Adjudication and the Rule of Law” (1960) 54 Proceedings of the American
Society of International Law and Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969) 1, citing M. Polanyi, The Logic of
Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) [hereinafter “Fuller”].
51
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and Immigration), Bastarache J. explained the concept of polycentricity as
it relates to the division of labour between the judiciary and the other
branches:
[T]he broad principle of ‘polycentricity’ [is] well known to academic
commentators who suggest that it provides the best rationale for judicial
deference to non-judicial agencies. A ‘polycentric issue is one which
involves a large number of interlocking and interacting interests and
considerations’ (P. Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law (3rd ed.
1996), at p. 35). While judicial procedure is premised on a bipolar
opposition of parties, interests, and factual discovery, some problems
require the consideration of numerous interests simultaneously, and the
promulgation of solutions which concurrently balance benefits and costs
for many different parties. Where an administrative structure more closely
resembles this model, courts will exercise restraint.56

Lon L. Fuller, writing with Kenneth I. Winston, explains polycentricity
using the image of a spider web: “each crossing of strands is a distinct
center for distributing tensions” and “[a] pull on one strand will
distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a
whole”.57 Elsewhere, Fuller notes that polycentric problems can have
rational solutions, but those solutions cannot be identified with reference
to external or a priori principles; they must rather be located through a
process of calibration whereby any one manoeuvre shifts the entire
calculus.58 Court delay is a polycentric issue: it involves numerous
stakeholders and could be addressed through multiple, non-exclusive
reforms, each of which would reverberate through a complex web of
governance within and beyond the criminal justice system.
By establishing a presumptive ceiling on delay with the express
purpose of incentivizing reform, the judiciary has effectively given
marching orders to the other branches. Over two decades ago, writing
about the Askov guidelines, Coughlan noted the objection that, “by
requiring one jurisdiction to allocate the same level of resources as other
jurisdictions, the court is stepping into the political arena. The decision
amounts to saying that the Ontario Government is required to allocate
fewer of its resources to health care and highways, and more to the
justice system.”59 The same could be said of Jordan. Indeed, the majority
56

[1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at para. 36 (S.C.C.).
L.L. Fuller & K.I. Winston, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 353 at 395.
58
Fuller, supra, note 55, at 4.
59
Coughlan, “A Bold Step, supra, note 14, at 250.
57
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went so far as to suggest how various stakeholders could potentially go
about reducing delay.60 If implemented, their suggestions would
invariably vibrate throughout the metaphorical policy web in precisely
the manner suggested by Coughlan’s analysis of Askov. The concern
therefore arises: has the Court overstepped?
In my view, this concern has limited merit. From a separation of
powers perspective, it may be unsatisfactory that the Court should
effectively obligate some jurisdictions to divert more resources towards
their criminal justice systems so that courthouses in, say, Calgary and
Charlottetown operate at relatively similar speeds. But, from a Charter
perspective, it is utterly unsatisfactory that an accused’s section 11(b)
right in Calgary should cash out as less valuable than her counterpart’s in
Charlottetown — which is precisely the result when the term
“unreasonable delay” is given starkly different interpretations across
the country. In this light, it is not the Court’s decision to give concrete
meaning to section 11(b) that constrains the other branches; it is
section 11(b) itself. That is precisely the role of the Charter. Moreover,
while executive and legislative choices are constrained by Jordan, they
are by no means ordained. Jordan does not prescribe any specific
policy response to delay, so much as make clear the consequence if
none is forthcoming.
Still, there is reason to be concerned that setting the ceiling is not an
appropriate task for the judiciary — not because the courts should be chary
of identifying clear constitutional limitations on polycentric executive and
legislative decision-making, but because establishing a time frame for
criminal trials requires a great deal of empirical research and analysis.
Courts may not be well placed to undertake this type of analysis, for several
reasons. First, courts rely heavily on the parties to gather and interpret
empirical evidence, and the parties may compile records that are more or
less complete. Second, many judges lack the methodological training
necessary to independently evaluate and apply empirical data, much less
supplement it through independent research.61 Ideally, the court would be
able to rely on clear expert evidence about the import and reliability of the
data on offer;62 but here again, judges are largely at the mercy of the parties,
who determine which expert evidence, if any, to present. Third, the lack of
60

Jordan, supra, note 2, at para. 140.
J. Lazare, “When Disciplines Collide: Polygamy and the Social Sciences on Trial” (2015)
32 Windsor Y.B. Access to Just. 103, at 108 [hereinafter “Lazare”].
62
D. Paciocco, “Taking a ‘Goudge’ Out of Bluster and Blarney: An ‘Evidence-Based
Approach’ to Expert Testimony” (2009) 13 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 135, at 149-50.
61
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methodological expertise among many judges (and among many of the
advocates charged with gathering and presenting empirical evidence, for
that matter) may reflect essential divergences between “the objectives and
values of the scientific enterprise and the legal culture” — including, most
notably, the tension between the empiricist’s project of gathering evidence
in order to reach a conclusion and the advocate’s project of gathering
evidence in order to buttress a conclusion.63 These related factors
complicate the use of empirical evidence by the courts, even as such
evidence helps them to resolve legal disputes.
All this brings us to Cromwell J.’s second objection: the ceiling is not
sufficiently evidence-based.64 To assess this objection, it is helpful to
consider how the majority set the ceiling. The majority explained that it
took the Morin guidelines as its staring point and adjusted them upwards
“to account for other factors that can reasonably contribute to the time it
takes to prosecute a case” including “the inherent time requirements of
the case and the increased complexity of criminal cases since Morin.”65 It
also “conducted a qualitative review of nearly every reported s. 11(b)
appellate decision from the past 10 years, and many decisions from trial
courts.”66 While this account is helpful, it is far from complete.67 We can
readily calculate that the majority increased the Morin guidelines by
adding a further eight to 10 months for provincial court and 12 to 16 months
for superior court, but it is not apparent how the majority generated those
numbers. The scope and methodology of the majority’s “qualitative
review” in particular is unclear.68
Justice Cromwell observed that, in contrast, when the Court developed
numerical guidelines in Askov and Morin, it did so on the basis of
“extensive evidence including statistical information from comparable
jurisdictions and expert opinion”.69 Notably, Baar — whose contributions to
the Morin record Cromwell J. expressly cited as evidence of that record’s
sufficiency70 — opined that the Askov Court went astray by trying to
63
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supplement the inadequate record through its own data-collection, while the
Morin Court misinterpreted the evidence before it.71 If the Askov record was
inadequate and the Morin record was misinterpreted, the Jordan record may
well have been both. With respect to its adequacy, Benjamin Perrin has
noted that the Court was “limited to information about case duration from
provincial court in Surrey, B.C.”; yet a recent study he co-authored with
Richard Audas reveals “wide variability in average case length across the
provinces and territories, ranging from 63 days to 271 days.”72 With respect
to the Court’s analysis, it is significant that, according to Baar, courts should
adopt a number of practices to help them interpret and apply social science
data correctly despite the sorts of challenges outlined above. First among
these suggestions is that courts should “make full use of the adversary
process. Courts undermine their own processes when they collect and
consider social facts after oral argument without providing an opportunity
for those facts to be tested.”73 The Jordan majority’s sua sponte posthearing review disregards this advice.
At this juncture, it is still too early to know how the Jordan
framework will play out in the long run. In practice, its effects are
likely to vary across jurisdictions given the regional disparities reported
by Perrin and Audas.74 Much will depend upon how different criminal
justice actors react. Their reactions will doubtless be informed by the
incentive structures put into place by Jordan. Those structures are shaped
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in part by the excision of prejudice as a factor in the section 11(b)
analysis: the issue to which I now turn.

V. WITHOUT PREJUDICE?
One of Jordan’s two contentions before the Supreme Court of Canada
was that the trial judge had erred in his assessment of prejudice. Prejudice
has long been a contentious and confusing aspect of the section 11(b)
analysis. It is uncontroversial that unreasonable delay is prejudicial to
accused persons. Delay impacts liberty interests by extending time spent in
custody or under bail conditions. It implicates security of the person insofar
as criminal charges entail stress and anxiety; disruptions to family, work,
and social life; financial strain; loss of privacy; and stigma. Delay can also
undermine an accused person’s ability to make full answer and defence,
since memories fade and evidence degrades over time.75 These sources of
prejudice are now settled in the jurisprudence.76 The controversy is about
how to incorporate them into the analysis so as to give due regard to the
prejudice caused by trial delay without making section 11(b) claims
conditional on the accused’s ability to prove concrete harm.
In the first Supreme Court case on the issue, Mills, Lamer and Wilson JJ.
espoused alternative views of prejudice that together helped shape the
jurisprudence in this area. Justice Lamer (as he then was) would have
excluded prejudice from the section 11(b) balancing analysis in favour of an
“irrebuttable presumption that, as of the moment of the charge, the accused
suffers a prejudice that the [section 11(b)] guarantee is aimed at limiting, and
that the prejudice increases over time.”77 In his view, although “prejudice
underlies the right”, “actual prejudice” should not matter to the assessment
because its absence cannot negate the claim.78 In contrast, Wilson J. wrote:
if delay has had the effect of impairing the accused’s ability to defend
the charge, and he can establish the necessary causal connection, I
cannot accede to the proposition that this is irrelevant in the assessment
of reasonableness. It seems to me that it may provide an alternate basis
of violation of the accused’s s. 11(b) right.79
75
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Over time, both views were incorporated into the law to some extent. In
Morin, the Court affirmed that prejudice could be inferred from the
length of delay and that actual prejudice could also be established. The
Court specified, however, that while prejudice could be inferred, this
presumption was neither automatic nor irrebuttable. The holding that
prejudice could be inferred in some cases but not others led to the
quixotic search for evidence of inferred prejudice.80
To remedy this confusion and reignite our commitment to timely trials,
the Jordan majority essentially adopted Lamer J.’s position in Mills.
An irrebuttable presumption of prejudice is now baked into the section 11(b)
framework. That presumption informs the setting of the presumptive ceiling.
Once the ceiling is breached, we presume that accused persons have suffered
prejudice to their Charter-protected liberty, security of the person, and fair
trial interests.81
Thus, the accused no longer needs to demonstrate prejudice — and it
appears the courts no longer have an avenue for considering it: prejudice
“no longer play[s] an explicit role in the s. 11(b) analysis”.82
There is much wisdom in establishing an irrebuttable presumption of
prejudice following unreasonable delay. This presumption reflects an
understanding that delay is not simply unreasonable to the extent that it
harms the accused; rather, delay always harms the accused because the
experience of being prosecuted is innately injurious. When the process
drags on for too long, the accused is entitled to a remedy. This analysis is
compelling, and it sidelines the cynical view that most accused persons
favour delay. The inclusion of an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice
within the Jordan framework is therefore welcome.
The exclusion of actual prejudice from the Jordan framework is less
welcome. It raises a couple of significant questions that will need to be
addressed in future cases.83 First, under prior jurisprudence, prejudice was a
key touchstone for assessing delay in cases of young offenders. It is wellsettled that timely trials are especially important for young persons given
80
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their perceptions of time and their lesser ability to appreciate the connection
between actions and consequences.84 Under Morin, the section 11(b) test
was identical for young persons and adults, but it was applied in light of
the increased prejudice experienced by youth awaiting trial.85 Now that
prejudice is no longer a factor, it remains to be seen whether and how
the Jordan framework will be adapted to account for the particularities
of young offenders.86
Likewise, the exclusion of prejudice from the analysis raises
questions about corporate defendants. In R. v. CIP Inc., the Court held
that prejudice could not be presumed or inferred in the case of corporate
defendants since the latter cannot logically claim their liberty or security
of the person was harmed by delay.87 (Corporate defendants were,
however, permitted to demonstrate actual impairment to their ability to
make full answer and defence.88) The Jordan ceiling is calibrated to
reflect presumed prejudice to liberty and security of person interests. As
such, one could argue that the ceiling should be raised for corporate
defendants who do not experience these harms. This possibility was
neither addressed nor identified in Jordan and so remains open for
contestation, although it seems the few courts that have considered it to
date have applied the Jordan ceiling to corporations without modification.89
More importantly, the removal of prejudice from the analysis creates
perverse incentives for criminal justice actors, in particular Crowns. With
that, we return to the question of how Jordan is likely to play out in
practice. When exercising their discretion to decide whether and how to
conduct prosecutions, Crowns are likely to be influenced by the fact that
prejudice is no longer a factor in the section 11(b) analysis. If actual
prejudice remained an explicit factor, then Crowns would be incentivized to
prioritize cases where accused persons faced greater prejudice since those
cases would be at heightened risk of being stayed. In particular, they would
be incentivized to press ahead in cases where the accused was awaiting trial
in custody or under especially restrictive bail conditions. The same goes for
84
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other institutional actors who have a hand in scheduling trials: they too
would be incentivized to allocate earlier trial dates to accused persons on
remand or under restrictive bail conditions. Further, Crowns would be
motivated to think carefully about whether to oppose release or to request
restrictive bail conditions in the first place, knowing that by doing so, they
would effectively lessen the amount of time on the clock.
Inasmuch as actual prejudice is not an explicit factor under Jordan,
Crowns and other officials are not working under these incentives.
Instead, they are incentivized to move forward with older cases first,
knowing that the ceiling is the same in all cases regardless of prejudice to
the accused. Concretely, this means that if Axel is awaiting his provincial
court trial and has already spent 10 months in a notoriously overcrowded
jail, while Buster is awaiting his provincial court trial and has been out
under minimally restrictive conditions for 15 months, then the Crown
and court officials will be incentivized to move forward with Buster’s
trial ahead of Axel’s. The Crown will also have less reason to accede to
Axel’s motion for pre-trial release. More generally, in regions where
cases have been routinely wrapping up before the 18- or 30-month mark,
Crowns could now pump the brakes, confident that section 11(b)
applications are unlikely to succeed before the ceiling is reached.90
These incentive structures work against the interests of justice.
Although severe restrictions on liberty are by no means the only harm
associated with trial delay, they are real and serious, and they are easy to
predict and track. Conditions in pre-trial custody are notoriously awful:
“an accused placed in remand is often subjected to the worst aspects of
our correctional system by being detained in dilapidated overcrowded
cells without access to recreational or educational programs.”91 For
people awaiting trial under these conditions, the hours are indeed long.92
Those held in pre-trial custody are more likely to plead guilty, to be
convicted at trial, and to receive heavier sentences.93 In light of the
elevated prejudice that is consistently experienced by accused persons
held on remand, it would have been better had the Jordan court either
90
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retained actual prejudice as an explicit factor in the analysis or set a
lower ceiling for accused persons awaiting trial in custody (and perhaps
for those awaiting trial under highly restrictive bail conditions). While
the latter approach would not account for all forms of prejudice, it would
promote better incentives for Crowns and court officials while maintaining
the relative simplicity and uniformity sought by Jordan.94
A further proposal, which would import additional complexity into the
framework but would promote even better incentive structures, would be to
adopt a strong or even irrebuttable presumption that an accused person’s
section 11(b) right has been violated once she has spent more time in pretrial custody than she could reasonably expect to spend in prison if
ultimately convicted. Such a presumption would address the perverse fact
that, for some accused persons, a guilty plea can actually result in a better
outcome than an acquittal. One such accused, Tassandra Whyte, recently
brought a successful application for bail review in which she argued that
the amount of time she was predicted to spend in pre-trial custody would
exceed the maximum sentence she would receive if convicted at trial.95
By the time the bail review decision was released, she had already spent
nearly two-and-a-half years in custody awaiting trial for a charge that
carried an anticipated penalty of three years, and her trial was not
scheduled to begin for at least another year. The Crown attorney in the
case agreed that if she were to plead guilty immediately, Whyte would
likely be released on the basis of time served.
It is easy to see why a person in Whyte’s circumstances might take
the plea, whether or not she was guilty. As one defence attorney noted,
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...People don’t want to sit in jail to get their day in court and be
vindicated. They would rather have their freedom. 96

This perverse incentive structure undermines the criminal justice
system’s truth-seeking and justice-promoting functions. It should be
eliminated. Were the Jordan ceiling uniformly lowered for accused
persons held in custody, and were it applied in light of an additional
presumption that delay is unreasonable if the accused spends more time
in pre-trial detention than she could expect to serve post-conviction, then
the incentives for institutional actors would improve.
In sum, the decision to remove prejudice from the section 11(b)
framework opens up areas of dispute and contestation while foreclosing
lines of argumentation that would have resulted in better incentives for
Crowns and other institutional actors. While we must wait and see how
Jordan plays out, particularly after the end of the transitional period,
these incentives, together with concerns about how the ceiling was
calibrated, suggest the results are likely to be mixed.

VI. CONCLUSION
Section 11(b) contemplates a delicate balance between speed-up and
delay — one that allows for both thorough, satisfactory processes and
timely case resolution. The appropriate balance would be hard to strike in
a well-resourced system. In our chronically underfunded system, it seems
unachievable. And yet, the Charter demands that we try. About a quartercentury after the Askov debacle, the Supreme Court has tried once again
to create a workable section 11(b) test.
Despite its shortcomings, the Jordan decision should be applauded for
unequivocally condemning the culture of delay and complacency that
had settled on our criminal justice system like a thick layer of dust. Read
together with the subsequent Cody decision,97 Jordan sends a strong
message that unreasonable delay is not to be tolerated and that all
institutional actors share a responsibility for preventing it. As Coughlan
observes, any new section 11(b) approach necessarily had to be
“superimposed on a system which has spent a quarter-century being
96
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unsympathetic to delay claims. Given the reality into which the new rules
must be introduced, one can have sympathy for the majority’s view that
nothing but grabbing the system by the scruff of the neck and shaking it
is likely to work.”98 It remains to be seen whether Jordan will indeed
prompt effective reform, but if it fails it will not be for lack of trying.
Ultimately, however Jordan plays out, section 11(b) will continue to
vex us. The possibility that we will ever achieve the ideal balance
between speed-up and delay is even more remote than the possibility that
the criminal justice system will cease to face resource limitations. Yet,
while the ideal balance may be unreachable, improvement is not. And if
we are to improve, we must begin by repudiating the belief that lengthy
delay is either inevitable or acceptable, and by affirming that it is
intrinsically prejudicial. The Jordan majority has done that much at
least.99 In this respect, its reasons call to mind the first lines of Waiting
for Godot; a play that, rather fittingly, is at least superficially about
unreasonable delay.100 One of the protagonists, Estragon, opens the play
by declaring: “Nothing to be done.” His interlocutor, Vladimir, replies:
“I’m beginning to come round to that opinion. All my life I’ve tried to
put it from me, saying Vladimir, be reasonable, you haven’t yet tried
everything. And I resumed the struggle.”101
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